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Theme: Southern Sudan’s historic referendum on whether to stay in or secede from a 
united Sudan is rapidly approaching. The political tide is flowing toward an independent 
country but the politics of Sudan’s North-South political transition remain beset with 
challenges. 
 
 
Summary: Southern Sudan is on the threshold of becoming an independent state, 
according to widespread popular Southern sentiment and the terms of Sudan’s North-
South peace agreement that allow the right to self-determination through a referendum. 
The sense of historic inevitability about this outcome, which would be achieved through 
the ‘referendum for freedom’, is set against an intensely political atmosphere. There are 
myriad risks of this vision being derailed, including problems derived from the second 
referendum on the future status of the special administrative area of Abyei. The 
outstanding challenge today lies in managing the probable break-up of Sudan in such a 
way as to best ensure peace. Providing war does no return, any such achievement, in 
itself considerable, will be followed by the formidable challenges of sustaining peace. 
 
 
 
Analysis: ‘I would vote for secession rather than unity’: in so uttering his ‘personal belief’ 
at a public rally in Southern Sudan’s capital Juba in early October 2010, Salva Kiir 
Mayardit, the President of the Government of Southern Sudan (GOSS) and national First 
Vice President of Sudan, very publicly articulated the views of many Southern Sudanese 
as their ‘referendum for freedom’ fast approaches. In response, the President of Sudan, 
Omar el-Bashir, spoke of a new war, accusing the Southern leader of reneging on the 
terms of the January 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). 
 
This was supposed to make Southern Sudan’s position in a united Sudan ‘attractive’. It 
has not. Now many Southerners literally count down the days to the vote, scheduled for 9 
January 2011. Some openly campaign for secession, with recent demonstrations in 
different Southern towns and Khartoum in favour of establishing an independent Southern 
Sudan. How did it come to this? What are the prospects for Southern Sudan ahead of the 
referendum, and beyond? This paper examines the context and current state of pre-
referendum Southern Sudan. In doing so, however, it is impossible not to factor in wider 
Sudanese dynamics. 
 
Background: the Comprehensive Peace Agreement 
The CPA was signed by the Government of Sudan (or the ruling National Congress Party, 
NCP) and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM), and ended over two 
decades of Sudan’s North-South and South-South civil wars. It codifies multiple 
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transitions: war to peace, relief to development, centralised authoritarian rule to 
democracy and a more equitable sharing of resources. Although widely trumpeted as the 
vehicle for Sudan’s ‘democratic transformation’, the CPA essentially moved a historically-
rooted conflict from the military to the political sphere. Politics, in effect, became the 
continuation of war through other means and today the overriding political goal is 
independence. 
 
The CPA, then, is about far more than just the Southern referendum. It also contains 
provision for addressing the future status of Sudan’s strategic and contested North-South 
border regions: a referendum on whether the special administrative area of Abyei will 
remain in North or South Sudan and ‘popular consultations’ by elected legislatures for 
Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile. In many ways, however, the South’s right to exercise 
self-determination through a vote was –and is now more widely seen as– its defining 
feature. The issue of self-determination for Southern Sudan can be traced back to British 
colonial policy and the process through which Sudan achieved independence in 1956, 
during which the South was manoeuvred out of fairly being able to decide its political 
future. Fighting broke out in Southern Sudan even before Sudan’s independence and 
grew into a secessionist conflict ended by a peace deal in 1972. The rebellion that broke 
out in 1983 was led by an SPLA fighting for a New Sudan –and not an independent 
South–. The principle of Southern Sudan’s right to self-determination was agreed in a 
1994 declaration, reiterated in the 2002 Machakos Protocol between the Sudan 
government and the SPLM, and enshrined in the CPA. The forthcoming Southern vote is 
regarded by many Southern Sudanese as the means to correct historic injustice; it is vital 
to appreciate this history and what Southerners want. 
 
By the time the CPA was signed in Nairobi, international attention had already switched to 
the escalating conflict in Sudan’s western region of Darfur. This meant that efforts to 
implement the CPA were set back from the start. It took too long for international attention 
to switch from Darfur back to Sudan’s North-South politics, where it is focused now 
(Darfur, once again, largely off the international radar). And for very good reasons, given 
the high stakes involved and the probability of a vote for independence. 
 
The State of the CPA 
In July 2005, at his inauguration in Khartoum as First Vice President of Sudan, the then 
Southern leader John Garang described the SPLM as ‘a national Movement for all of 
Sudan, a movement for the New Sudan’ and appealed ‘to all Sudanese to join the SPLM 
and safeguard the unity of our country by making unity attractive’. On his return to the 
Southern town of Rumbek he proclaimed a ‘new start’ for Sudan at a large public rally. 
Then, everyone was looking forward to what peace might achieve. Announcing that the 
SPLM would move to its new capital of Juba, the optimism he generated was palpable 
amidst celebrations of peace. Not long afterwards, however, he died in a freak helicopter 
crash and so did any prospect, if there had ever been one, that the vision of a reformed, 
united New Sudan he championed might be a viable political project. 
 
The balance sheet on CPA progress since 2005 is unsurprisingly mixed. Two 
governments –a national government of unity and semi-autonomous Southern 
government– were established and have functioned since 2005. Wealth-sharing between 
North and South Sudan has been more or less successful, despite disputes about oil 
money transfers in a highly opaque industry. The census was completed, two years late. 
The April 2010 elections were also late, but passed without serious violence and, most 
importantly, the results were agreed. These confirmed the prevailing balance of power in 
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Northern Sudan under Bashir’s NCP and Southern Sudan under Kiir’s SPLM. In 
effectively formalising a ‘one Sudan, two systems’ polity, the elections paved the way for 
the vote that matters most for the South. 
 
The national elections were interesting partly for what did not happen: the SPLM did not 
challenge Bashir in the national presidential elections, after its candidate Yasser Arman 
withdrew at the last minute (still gaining about 20% of the vote) leaving Bashir to win the 
crown. Now faded posters in Juba and other Southern towns bearing the slogan ‘vote 
Yasser Arman for the democratic transformation’ symbolise the SPLM’s abandonment of 
the New Sudan vision, the project of Sudan-wide political reform, and its withdrawal to 
focus on the New South Sudan vision, the project of Southern independence. Large 
colour billboards featuring the martyr John Garang now proclaim the ‘final walk to 
freedom’; others ‘freedom through referendum’. 
 
Sudan’s much talked about ‘peace dividend’ has proved to be an elusive phenomenon for 
ordinary Sudanese, particularly in the South. A transformation of an historically 
entrenched set of power imbalances would have been required to actually ‘make unity 
attractive’ to Southerners. Even had there been real political will, the challenges were truly 
daunting. It is not surprising, therefore, that unity has not been made attractive to 
Southerners and instead the question ‘how could unity have been made attractive’ is more 
frequently asked, post-mortem style. On top of a history of oppression and armed 
struggle, a decisive factor has been the incongruence between the NCP’s apparent new-
found faith in peace, as expressed in the CPA, and the violence it has sponsored in 
Darfur. Unleashing a brutal counter-insurgency campaign based on armed proxies, a 
tactic all too familiar in Southern Sudan where it was developed, was further proof for 
Southerners, if any more were needed, of the nature of the Khartoum regime, whose 
interest in peace with the South seemed partly motivated by the expedient reason of 
needing to respond to armed rebellion in the west, Darfur. 
 
Preparing for Sudan’s Referendums 
The late adoption of the Southern Sudan Referendum Act in December 2009 put the 
referendum process behind schedule. The Act stipulates that a simple majority (50% plus 
1 of the votes) will decide its outcome, but requires 60% of registered voters to vote for 
secession (failing which there would be a repeat vote within 60 days of the final results). 
This quorum requirement has prompted concern about possible rigging of the turnout. 
Such legal technicalities, however, are certain to be trumped by political demands and 
Southern expectations of an inevitable ‘yes’ vote. 
 
Political differences and the basic logistics of a hugely demanding exercise mean that 
preparations for the Southern referendum continue to be far behind schedule. The body 
charged with overseeing the process, the Southern Sudan Referendum Commission, was 
finally established, after a long politically-caused delay, in June 2010. Voter eligibility and 
registration remain ongoing concerns; the SSRC postponed this until it finally began in 
mid-November 2010. Much attention is being directed towards the need to ensure a 
credible, legitimate referendum process and outcome through strong oversight 
mechanisms and international monitoring. The UN has been scaling up its practical 
support, establishing referendum centres in all states. Overall, the practicalities for holding 
the referendum remain to be put into place, but are being rolled out amidst political 
controversy. 
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There is also no agreement between the NCP and the SPLM on post-referendum 
arrangements. In June 2010 the two parties announced that they would continue 
negotiations on four ‘clusters’: (1) citizenship; (2) security; (3) financial, economic and 
natural resources; and (4) international treaties and legal issues. However, the continuing 
lack of agreement is cause for concern given the importance of the issues involved. 
These include future resource-sharing arrangements –not just oil revenues, but also 
water, a concern of Egypt and neighbouring countries–. Citizenship is another contentious 
issue, involving as it does the future status of the high numbers of Southerners in northern 
Sudan. Final North-South border demarcation remains to be fully agreed and has been an 
ongoing point of contention in relation to the referendum: the NCP argues the referendum 
should not take place until this is agreed, and the SPLM argues it must take place on 
schedule. 
 
Many of these issues are condensed into Abyei, a critical strategic border region whose 
own referendum is even further behind schedule. The CPA’s Abyei protocol mandated a 
six-year interim period of joint SPLM-NCP administration of the region followed by a 
referendum on whether it should remain within the North or join the South. The NCP and 
SPLM differed on Abyei’s border demarcation. The Abyei Boundaries Commission report, 
which was supposed to produce a final, binding settlement, was rejected by the NCP. In 
July 2009, a ruling by the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague reduced Abyei’s 
borders, leaving control of many key oilfields with Khartoum. 
 
For good reasons, some now talk of the region of as a possible West Bank of Sudan in 
the making, with all the potential to destabilise any future relations between North and 
South Sudan. In May 2008, illustrating Abyei’s flashpoint status, fighting erupted there and 
some 60,000 people were displaced southwards by the northern Sudan army. While the 
Abyei Area Referendum Act was agreed at the end of 2009, the Abyei Referendum 
Commission has not yet been established. 
 
Recent Developments 
The process and outcome of the Southern and Abyei referendum connect multiple 
interlinked local, national, regional and international factors. Successful CPA 
implementation would mean, in essence, the achievement of a formal post-referendum 
peace in Sudan through an agreed outcome. This would not just spell enormous 
dividends within Sudan but also make a major contribution to preserving peace in the 
region. Any serious CPA derailment would mean a return to war, which would be far more 
destructive than before. The Northern army is committed to Darfur and internally divided 
but both it and the SPLA have enhanced their military capacity since 2005 and the SPLA 
has vowed to take any new war to the North. Any new armed conflict under these 
changed circumstances would not only be far more destructive but also contain the 
inherent probability of regional entanglement. 
 
International concern, led by the US, has increased as the referendum looms in January. 
The September Sudan meeting on the fringes of the UN in New York was notable, 
followed not long afterwards by a visit by the UN Security Council to Sudan. 
 
In Northern Sudan, NCP leaders have voiced their opposition to the idea of Southern 
independence. There has been NCP sabre-rattling against the SPLM. The North is 
divided (as a recent fatwa against Bashir accusing him of being complicit in America’s 
plan to split Sudan showed). Others have been waving olive branches. The result is mixed 
messages, President Bashir also proclaiming his support for Southern Sudan if it chooses 
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secession, with uncertainty about possible hard-line reaction from Khartoum to the 
Southern referendum. 
 
Within the South, the SPLM has sought to bring Southerners working for the NCP back 
into the fold, pardoning those who fought against the SPLA. The All-Southern Sudanese 
Political Parties Conference in Juba in October 2010 discussed peace and reconciliation, 
referendum preparations and looked forward to its outcomes. The question of a possible 
unilateral Southern declaration of independence –the ‘UDI option’– has been publicly 
rejected by Salva Kiir, amongst others. Should Southerners be denied their referendum, 
there is popular pressure on the Southern government to hold its own or declare 
independence anyway. This would create a host of political and legal challenges, and 
tempt spoilers fishing in troubled waters to exploit the situation militarily. For Southern 
Sudan, so much upon the legitimacy of following the terms of the CPA, an agreement 
recognised by Sudan’s different bilateral external partners, regional organisations like the 
African Union and the League of Arab States, and the UN. Anything the South does –as 
opposed to the NCP– that breaks with the CPA, like UDI, poses high risks. 
 
Much against the CPA’s neat roadmap, this process is messy, ad hoc and intensely 
political with all the attendant dangers of destabilisation this entails. The road to the 
referendum is fraught with potential pitfalls but if it can be held on time, then its conduct 
will be important and, crucially, results and reception of possible outcomes. Managing the 
aftermath will become the key challenge. 
 
Prospects for South Sudan 
The issue of state-building is central to Southern Sudan’s future. The core challenge is 
that posed by the nature of the government of Southern Sudan. It may have a state-of-
the-art liberal constitution and formal institutional architecture but, barely five years old, 
has only begun to establish itself from an extremely weak foundation. The transition from 
successful guerrilla movement to government has not been easy, quite aside from politics. 
The numbers of qualified, competent civil servants to administer the central state in Juba 
are scarce but the government has a large payroll. It is almost totally dependent on oil 
revenues transferred from the North. Security expenditure dominates the budget, 
understandably since the military is seen as the best deterrent against the North. 
Corruption is cited as the most important issue by Salva Kiir, having already undermined 
the government’s legitimacy. 
 
The future international role in Southern Sudan is a major issue. A growing number of 
foreign consulates have been established in Juba, from Egypt, Ethiopia, Kenya and 
Uganda, to Libya, the US, the UK, Norway, China and India. The GOSS has called for a 
long-term UN presence and a UN force at the borders for the referendum. Based on 
needs and the calls by Southern leaders, it is clear that Southern Sudan wants and will 
need substantial international assistance in the future. The question of how the work of an 
already substantial and diverse international presence can be made to support, and not 
unintentionally undermine, the growth of an effective Southern Sudanese state remains a 
live conundrum. 
 
Should the South become a new state, can it become a nation? This question is 
commonly asked in the face of ongoing intra-Southern conflicts and in a sense touches on 
how to make unity possible and attractive for Southerners in a future Southern Sudan. An 
important source of Southern unity in the past has been that produced by opposition to a 
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shared Northern enemy. Relations between Southerners themselves will be a further 
ongoing challenge, with ‘South-South’ conflicts looking set to continue. 
 
Any new state would also be vulnerable to possible conflict in the borderlands, which 
could become the new peripheries of Northern Sudan, or the North’s ‘new South’. Abyei 
thus looms especially large, as do the other border areas, which could themselves 
become new epicentres of conflict involving the South. The continuing war in Darfur and 
simmering tension in east Sudan poses threats. Any consideration of Southern Sudan’s 
future prospects thus cannot be considered apart from the wider Sudan context in which it 
will remain embedded. 
 
Conclusion 
 
‘The Final Decisive Moment’ 
Next to John Garang’s Juba memorial there is a lantern lit ‘In hope and prayers for every 
CPA Dictum including 2011 the final decisive moment’. New Sudan’s former champion 
thought the best way to better Southern Sudan’s position within Sudan was to create a 
reformed Sudan, and fought for this. Now, however, his memorial is close to becoming a 
shrine to the founding father of an independent South Sudan. 
 
Southern politics is now squarely focused on the referendum. Perhaps too much hope is 
placed in the vote: to rectify perceived historic injustice of the denial of the right to self-
determination and decades of suffering, to deliver peace and, finally, real development to 
correct entrenched marginalisation within Sudan. In September 2010, a new South 
Sudanese national anthem was released, to praise by many Southerners and 
condemnation by the NCP. Amongst other things, it exhorts Southerners to ‘sing songs of 
freedom with joy, for peace, liberty and justice, shall forever more reign’. The eloquence of 
such aspirations in view of the history of conflict is striking; so is its distance from political 
reality. Despite today’s prevailing sense of inevitability about the prospect of Southern 
political independence, much remains to be decided and such a result is unlikely to be 
achieved smoothly. The Southern referendum process, let alone Abyei should that 
happen, is fraught with dangers of being destabilised if not derailed. 
 
Internal and external responses to the declared outcome will be important. There remains 
the probability of political turbulence. The best hope is that the two parties, supported 
where possible by international players, can implement the final stages of the CPA, 
conduct referendums whose outcomes can be agreed, finalise a deal on post-referendum 
arrangements and manage a consensual divorce. Deciding and managing the outcome is 
primarily Sudan’s responsibility and is fundamentally a Sudanese process. External 
support is important and necessary to support this, but will not be sufficient if the political 
will to oversee a successful conclusion to the CPA is not maintained. Peace and stability 
in Sudan and the broader region depend on the Southern referendum being conducted 
and on the peaceful implementation of its outcome. The countdown to the scheduled vote, 
and that in Abyei, is proceeding rapidly, though this date may be delayed. 
 
Not enough attention is being paid to how to respond to the main possible outcomes of 
the votes and what happens after. National, regional and international organisations need 
to prepare themselves for a range of possible outcomes, the best scenario being 
comparative peace, the worst a bloody war. The outstanding current challenge has 
become one of managing Sudan’s break-up in such a way as to best ensure an absence 
of war. Any such achievement will be followed by the formidable challenges of sustaining 
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peace. Today, most Southern Sudanese look to the SPLM to deliver their independence. 
After that, they will also expect it to deliver development and base its legitimacy not just 
on its military record but also on its political performance. The CPA end-game is in full 
motion but Sudan’s multiple transitions continue. 
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